Public Pensions, the Labour Market and Compliance by McGillivray, Warren
Hitotsubashi University Repository







RightInternational Conference on 

























PIE and COE/RES, Hitotsubashi University 
 
Hitotsubashi Collaboration Center, Tokyo, Japan, 23-24 February 2004           DRAFT 
Project on Intergenerational Equity 
 
Pensions in Asia: Incentives, Compliance and their Role in Retirement 
(Tokyo, 23-24 February 2004) 
 




I have been invited to make summary comments on the presentations which have been 
made over the last two days. I will focus on two issues. The first concerns the wider 
implications of population ageing, and the second, a critical administration topic. The first 
topic concerns industrialized countries now and developing countries later; the second 
applies to all contributory social security schemes. 
 
Clearly, we all agree that public pension schemes face the challenge of producing a 
continuing and adequate retirement income throughout a person’s retirement years and 
those of his or her dependants, and that this challenge becomes more difficult in the face of 
population ageing.  
 
Similarly, we agree that public pensions are consumption allocation mechanisms – 
arrangements for transferring resources from workers to pensioners at the time the pensions 
are paid. Under the pay-as-you-go system the transfer is direct through contributions or taxes 
paid by workers. Under the funded system, pensioners liquidate assets which they have 
accumulated by selling their assets to workers. In both cases workers’ disposable income is 
reduced by the amount of resources transferred to retired persons. 
 
Enormous attention has been focused on whether the challenge of providing sustainable 
pensions through equitable transfers can be achieved by defined benefit or defined 
contribution schemes, financing by pay-as-you-go or funding, public or private management 
and with price or wage indexation of benefits. Attention to these features of a public pension 
scheme has obscured the fundamental issue – how ageing societies will be able to produce 
the goods and services required by all segments of the population. 
 
The effect of population ageing on pensions has attracted much attention, despite other 
implications of population ageing such as the demand for health care, probably because 
robust projections of future expenditures to meet public pension promises can be made. And, 
unlike future health care expenditures, cutting future pensions is thought to be feasible. 
 
The problem of supporting ageing populations is not solved by funding public pension 
schemes. In pay-as-you-go schemes it is uncertain whether declining relative proportions of 
active workers have the capacity and the will to pay the pensions of increasing numbers of 
pensioners. In funded schemes the uncertainty is whether there will be a systemic decline in 
asset values when pensioners seek to realize their assets by selling them to the declining 
relative proportions of active workers 
 
According to Barr (1998), the fundamental issue is not the financial system which is used to 
determine how output is divided between workers and pensioners. Rather, “The choice 
between PAYG and funding in the face of demographic change is [therefore] relevant only to 
the extent that funding … systematically causes output to be higher.” [emphasis in original]  
 
Support of increasing numbers of retired persons is possible only if output grows – only if 
economic growth is sufficiently robust to generate the resources to be transferred to retired  2
persons without unduly depriving active workers.
1 It is held by some that if economic growth 
continues as it has since World War II, there will be sufficient output to distribute under pay-
as-you-go systems. See, for example, Eisner (1995), Mullan (1999) and Baker and Weisbrot 
(1999). 
 
Many have sought to demonstrate that increased saving through operating a funded scheme 
will stimulate economic growth. While this proposition is intuitively persuasive – a funded 
scheme should ultimately increase saving and the increased saving should result in 
increased investment and thereby increased output – given uncertain market capacities and 
the uncertain allocation of investments, convincing empirical evidence of the effect of a 
funded public scheme on saving has been elusive. 
 
 
Labour market issues – Retirement age 
It is the potential labour market implications and consequent economic distributional and 
output issues arising from population ageing – not the the relative merits of different public 
pension arrangements – which are the key to designing sustainable public pension schemes. 
 
The World Economic Forum Pension Readiness Initiative focuses on population ageing from 
the perspective of macroeconomic concerns over productivity and the standard of living of 
the entire population. Virtually everyone living in a society is a consumer and, in general, all 
consumers are dependent on workers in a society to produce the goods and services they 
consume. Hence the issue becomes labour supply – not simply how much a retired person’s 
pension costs – but how much output and general welfare is lost because the person is not 
working. Rather than focusing on reforms of existing public pension schemes, attention 
should be on “potential policies that specifically target the deterioration of public budgets as a 
result of population aging and public pension schemes and [to explore] policies and 




Economic output depends on the supply of workers, capital and technology. If current 
working patterns persist, the labour force growth which most industrialized countries have 
experienced over the last half-century is likely to be reversed in the near future. For example, 
in Japan the population base of the labour force (all persons aged 15 to 65) was 60% of the 
total population from 1950 to 1975, rose to 68% in 2000 and is projected to fall to 60% by 
2025 and 51% by 2050. (Based on World Population Ageing 1950-2050, United Nations 
(2002).) Slower growing or contracting workforces will create labour shortages which can 
lead to economic stagnation or decline. In turn, this would lead to lower rates of improvement 
or to a decrease in living standards.  
 
If the labour force is declining as a proportion of an ageing population and improvement in 
living standards is slowed, which parts of the population will bear the brunt of the slowdown? 
If retired persons benefit generously from worker productivity growth, then the standard of 
living of workers and their dependants will not fully reflect workers’ productivity increases. 
Will workers be eager to achieve higher levels of productivity if they do not benefit 
substantially from any increases? Alternatively, if workers are insulated from the economic 
implications of ageing populations, the standard of living of retired persons will decrease. 
Ultimately, under this scenario the choice becomes (1) how to allocate diminishing output 
among different segments of society or (2) what policies should be pursued that will sustain 
economic growth and thereby allow all segments of society to benefit. 
 
According to the Pension Readiness Initiative while increased capital investment can 
improve worker efficiency, this cannot make up for the entire shortfall in productivity. Rather, 
the policies required involve fundamental changes in current labour force patterns. In  3
particular, labour force participation of younger retirees, women and young adults should be 
increased.  
 
Immigration at levels which would be required to sustain economic growth would be socially 
and politically unacceptable. According to The Economist (10 January 2004), Japan (with a 
population of 127 million) would have to import five million workers (along with their 
dependants) during the next decade simply to maintain the current rate of improvement in 
living standards. 
 
Whereas a half-century ago, in the industrialized countries, the typical retirement period was 
around one-third of the working period, now in some countries it is approaching two-thirds of 
this period. Increasingly, workers opt for early retirement which means the actual retirement 
age is significantly lower than the normal retirement age set for the public pension scheme. 
Raising the normal retirement age has proved to be a difficult political choice and it is a 
potential cause of ‘reform deadlock’. To avoid disturbing the plans of workers who are near 
retirement, increases in the retirement age must be phased in over long periods.  
 
From the United States Social Security Administration (2002) life tables, in 1935 when the 
retirement age was set at 65, the expectation of life of a male aged 65 was approximately 12 
years. Assuming a male entered the labour force at age 20, his average period in retirement 
would be 27 per cent of the time he had spent working. In 1980, to maintain the same ratio of 
the retirement period to the working period, the male retirement age should be 67. In 1983 
the normal retirement age for full social security pensions in the USA was raised to 67, with 
the increase fully effective in 2027. 
 
While changes in the normal retirement age in a defined benefit scheme are inevitably long-
term projects, efforts can be made to discourage early retirement and encourage deferring 
retirement. Greater than actuarial reductions can be made to calculate early retirement 
pensions, and inducements can be offered for deferring retirement. A probable, albeit 
perhaps unintended, result of replacing defined benefit with defined contribution schemes is 
that successive cohorts of contributors will have to work longer than they would have had to 
under the defined benefit scheme in order to accumulate sufficient stocks of assets at 
retirement to purchase adequate pensions. 
 
Hence, one means of helping to sustain productivity is a reform which has long been 
advocated – raising the retirement age in public pension schemes. But, now the reason is not 
only to increase the income and reduce the outgo of a public pension scheme, but the 





Much attention is paid to design features and the economic impact of contributory public 
pension schemes. However, unless an administrative operation – ensuring compliance with 
the contribution conditions of the scheme – is well-executed, all other aspects of the scheme 
are irrelevant. 
 
Compliance refers to the registration of eligible members and paying contributions in respect 
of them in the correct amounts when they are due in accordance with the conditions set by a 
contributory social insurance scheme. Contributions are normally paid by employers in 
respect of their employees and by self-employed persons themselves. Since non-compliance 
– contribution evasion – is illegal, it is difficult to obtain reliable statistics on its extent. 
 
Contribution evasion is not confined to developing countries where administrative 
infrastructures are less sophisticated than in industrialized countries. In the United States, in  4
1997 the total of contributions not paid voluntarily was estimated to be 10.3 per cent of the 
estimated liability. The percentages were 4.2 and 58.7 for employees and the self-employed 
respectively. (See McGillivray (2001)) According to the Japan Times (5 August 2003) 37.2 
per cent of the members of the National Pension Programme failed to pay their contributions 
in the 2002-03 fiscal year. The non-payers were generally self-employed persons (who 
generally have a poor record of compliance with social security schemes). Compliance in 
privately managed defined contribution individual accounts schemes is often weak, 
especially if employers pay contributions directly to individual account managers rather than 
to a central collection agency. 
 
There are a multitude of motivations for employers and scheme members to evade paying 
contributions: employers seeking to reduce their labour costs; administrative complexity of 
complying; workers’ current needs and perhaps myopia; workers’ strategic manipulation of 
the pension scheme benefit formula; lack of confidence in the pension scheme.  
 
In a defined benefit scheme, evasion reduces pensions and can threaten the solvency of the 
scheme. In a defined contribution scheme, evasion leads to a lower balance to be converted 
into a pension at the time a member retires.  
 
Social security organizations can combat evasion, but they must have the statutory authority 
required for effective enforcement of contribution conditions. If government does not grant a 
social security organization the necessary authority, the commitment of the government to 
the social security programme is in question, enforcement is hampered and ineffective and 
benefit expectations are not met.  
 
Social security schemes need: 
•  the unfettered right to inspect employer records;  
•  the right to assess and collect contributions due and unpaid and assess penalties. 
 
Armed with statutory authority, social security organizations can take a number of steps to 
both encourage and enforce compliance, for example: 
 
•  streamline administrative procedures; 
•  strengthen enforcement activities (which are an important and legitimate expense of a 
scheme); 
•  enforce administrative penalties for evasion; 
•  undertake public relations campaigns;  
•  report regularly (annually at least) to workers on contributions paid;  
•  collect pension contributions along with contributions for other social security benefits; 
•  apply regulations which require an employer to be certified by the scheme before the 
employer can undertake activities involving the government; 
•  remedy scheme design deficiencies which encourage evasion; 
•  coordinate verification and enforcement activities with the tax collection agency; 
•  declare amnesties.  
 
Failure to comply with the contribution obligations of a social security scheme threatens the 
legitimacy of the scheme, the adequacy of the social protection of members whose 
contributions due have not been paid and the financial viability of a defined benefit scheme. 
High levels of evasion can indicate low public credibility of a social security scheme, and 
reflect on the quality of governance and efficiency of scheme administration. Governments 
should beware: if widespread evasion results in generally inadequate pensions, given their 
political influence, the increasing numbers of retired persons will oblige governments to 
supplement their pensions.  5
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1 Thompson (1998) disaggregates the retirement burden: 
 
Retirement burden = Consumption of retired persons/GDP = 
 
 (1)    Total  consumption/GDP 
  X  
(2)   Average consumption of retired persons 
             Average consumption of total population 
  X  
(3)  Number of retirement pensioners 
  Total  population 
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